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ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION:
A LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION

Tanja Rapus Benton,* Stephanie A. McDonnell,' Judge
Neil Thomas, ± DavidF. Ross,* & Nicholas Honerkamp+

I.

Introduction
This article is a state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit

analysis of judicial decisions on the admissibility of expert
testimony on eyewitness identification problems. The basis

for the admission of expert testimony is analyzed, and then
the rationale used in those decisions is considered with
regard to the current data from psychological studies. This
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article also addresses the apparent disregard of social

science research by the judicial system.
H.

Issues Raised in Daubert and McDaniel
Under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the

Tennessee Rules of Evidence, a witness generally may not

give "testimony in the form of opinions." An exception is
contained, however, in Rule 702 of the Federal version,
which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." 2 The Tennessee version of that
rule is the same with the exception of one addition; the3
word "substantially" precedes the word "assist."
Additionally, Rule 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence

provides that expert testimony shall be disallowed where
"the underlying facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness," 4 a requirement not contained in Rule 703
of the Federal Rules.5
Under Rule 104(a), whether a witness will be
permitted to testify as an expert is first a determination for
the court. 6 Both Rules 104 and 702 are silent concerning
how that determination is to be made. 7 Under the Federal
Rules, the United States Supreme Court gave the necessary
guidance to the trial court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
8
The Tennessee Supreme Court
Pharmaceuticals.
1FED. R. EvID. 70 1(a); TENN. R. EvID. 70 1(a).

2 FED. R. EvID. 702.

3 TENN. R. EvID. 702.
4 TENN. R. EvID. 703.

5 FED. R. EVID. 703.
6 FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
7 FED. R. EvID. 104, 702.
8 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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provided similar assistance in McDaniel v. CSX
Transportation,Inc.9 Or did they?
In Daubert, the case went before the United States
Supreme Court after the trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant. The trial court did so because
the opinions expressed in the expert affidavits submitted by
the plaintiffs did not "have general acceptance in the field
to which it belongs"' 0 under the test articulated in United
States v. Kilgus."l The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying
upon Frye v. United States.12 After a granting certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and established a
new rule with respect to the admissibility of expert
opinions. Holding that the Frye test was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court first
examined Rule 402 to determine whether it required
"general acceptance" and found that neither Rule 402 nor
Rule 702 required such an analysis.' 3 The Court held that
the Frye test was a rigid requirement "at odds with the
liberal thrust of the Federal Rules, and their general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion
testimony."' 14 In its analysis of the factors that must be
applied to determine admissibility, the Court held that the
subject of the expert's testimony must be scientific
knowledge. 15
The Court used Webster's Third New
International Dictionary to define what constituted
9 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997).

10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.

Cal. 1989).
1 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
12 293 F. 1013 (1923).
13 Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, and
defines relevant evidence as that evidence which has "any tendency to
make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 402.
14 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. at 590.
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scientific knowledge. The Court emphasized that science is
a process, and "in order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method."' 16 The Court held that the use of
scientific knowledge as the basis of expert opinion
"establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."' 7 In a
footnote to that statement, the Court found that "evidentiary
'8
reliability will be based upon scientific validity."'
The Court then examined the "assistance" language
of Rule 702 and stated that requirement goes to
relevance. 19 The Court returned to the requirement under
Rule 702 that there should be "a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry." 2 °
Next, the Court turned to the factors that should be
considered by the trial court in ruling on the admissibility
of the expert's opinion. The preliminary assessment, which
the trial court must use, is "whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid.",2 1 The Court expressed confidence that federal
judges possess the capacity to make this assessment, an
assumption that will be placed severely in doubt later in
this article.
The first of four factors listed by the Court was
whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested,
Next, the Court listed peer
also known as falsifiability.
review as a factor, though the decision then stated that in
some cases "well-grounded but innovative theories will not

16id.

171d.

18 Id. at 591, n.9 (emphasis omitted).

19 Interestingly, as will be discussed later, the citation given by the
Court for this issue is United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985), a case admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification.
20
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
21
1d. at 592-93.
22 Id. at 593.

4
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have been published., 23 Although the Court relied upon
whether the theory has been published in a peer reviewed
journal, it failed to define the factors under which a journal
will be considered a peer review journal. The third factor
identified by the Court was the known or potential rate of
error, which the Court again failed to state how that
determination is to be made.24 Finally, the Court listed
"general acceptance" as a factor, citing Downing,25 but
again giving no guidance on how to define this factor. 26 In
its opinion, the Court stressed that the determination made
by the trial 27
court should focus on the methodology, not the
conclusion.
At the end of its decision, the Court made a
significant comparison between science and law, the
ramifications of which could be momentous. The Court
stated, "There are important differences between the quest
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes
finally and quickly. 28 This statement implies that law is
not subject to perpetual revision, and, therefore, it implies
that under stare decisis the law should change little, even
though science may change dramatically.
This article will now address the assistance
29
provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in McDaniel.
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has provided more
guidance on this issue than the United States Supreme
Court, certain critical issues remain, especially when
considering cases decided after Daubert. One such issue is
the preliminary issue of the role of the trial judge under
23

1d.

24

Id. at 594.

25

753 F.2d at 1224.

26

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
27Id. at 595.
28
1Id. at 596-97.
29
McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 257.
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Rule 104. After Daubert,some suggest that the role of the
trial judge is not to become expert enough in the science
under consideration or to choose between conflicting
scientific theories, but simply to keep an opinion in the
form of pure speculation from the jury. On that issue,
however, Tennessee is more restrictive as compared to the
language in the Federal Rules of Evidence because of the
language contained in Rules 702 and 703 of the Tennessee
Rules of Evidence. Thus, Tennessee requires the following
assessment by the trial court:
The rules together [702 and 703] necessarily
require a determination as to the scientific
validity or reliability of the evidence.
Simply put, unless the scientific evidence is
valid, it will not substantially assist the trier
of fact, nor will its underlying facts and data
appear to be trustworthy, but there is no
requirement in the rule that it be generally
accepted.3 °
After making this statement, the court suggested that the
trial court "need not weigh or choose between two
The
legitimate but conflicting scientific views., 3 1
Tennessee Supreme Court then held that "it is important to
emphasize that the weight to be given to stated scientific
theories, and the resolution of legitimate but competing
scientific views,
are matters appropriately entrusted to the
32
trier of fact."
Thus, if there are competing opinions which are
admitted because the methodologies are correct, the jury
must determine which conclusion is valid. The procedural
fact pattern in McDaniel was similar to that in Daubert. In
30

Id. at 265.

31id.
32

id.

6
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McDaniel, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's
motion in limine to determine the admissibility of
plaintiffs experts. 33 After the hearing, the trial court ruled
that the evidence was admissible, but certified the issue to
the Court of Appeals, which declined to take the
interlocutory appeal. 34 Upon application, the Tennessee
Supreme Court granted the appeal.35 Although the court
declined expressly to adopt Daubert, it gave a list of nonexclusive factors for a trial judge to consider which are
almost identical to the factors in Daubert:
A Tennessee trial court may consider in
determining
reliability:
(1)
whether
scientific evidence has been tested and the
methodology with which it has been tested;
(2) whether the evidence has been subjected
to peer review or publication; (3) whether a
potential rate of error is known; (4) whether,
as formerly required by Frye, the evidence is
generally accepted in the scientific
community; and (5) whether the expert's
research in the field has
been conducted
36
independent of litigation.
In adopting the foregoing list, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declined to adopt a standard for an epidemiological
study as a matter of law. 37 The defendant contended that
on a scale of 1.0 to 4.0, where 4.0 shows a high correlation
of causation between exposure and disease, the court
should adopt a relative risk of greater than 2.0.38 The court
31 Id. at 258.
34 i.
35 i.
36

Id. at 265.

37

"d.
38

at 258.

Id. at 259, n.3.

7
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declined. 39
Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court directed the
issue back to the trial court, stating:
We recognize that the burden placed on trial
courts to analyze and to screen novel
scientific evidence is a significant one. No
framework exists that provides for simple
and practical application in every case; the
complexity and diversity of potential
scientific evidence is simply too vast for the
application of a single test .... Nonetheless,
the preliminary questions must be addressed
by the trial court, see, Tenn. R. Evid. 104,
and they must be addressed within the
framework of rules 702 and 703.40
Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court, like the United States
Supreme Court, expresses great confidence in the ability of
trial judges, despite their lack of scientific training, to
properly sort out conflicting scientific opinions (often at
opposite ends of the spectrum) and make a decision on
admissibility. Then, to compound matters, if the judge
decides that the conflicting opinions are admissible, the
jury, often with even less training, is asked to make a
decision as to which applies, all because, according to the
decisions discussed later in this review, rigorous cross
examination and instructions by the court will help them
sort it out.41

39

1d. at 260.

40id.

41

J.L. Devenport et al., How Effective are the Cross-Examination and

Expert Testimony Safeguards? Jurors' Perceptions of the
Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 87 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1042-1054 (2002).
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42
Issues Raised in State v. Coley

In 1996, defendant Eddie V. Coley sought to
introduce testimony from Dr. Michael G. Johnson, an
expert in the field of eyewitness identification in a
Williamson County Circuit Court.4 3
The proffered
testimony included: information on the relationship
between stress and memory for an event; cross-racial
identification; the relationship between confidence and
accuracy; the effect of time on remembering; and the
44
suggestibility of the photographic lineup used in the case.
The State objected to the testimony on the ground that it
was unnecessary to help the jury decide the issue of
identification.
The trial court agreed and excluded the
expert's testimony. 46 Coley was subsequently convicted of
aggravated robbery and sentenced to twelve years in jail.4 7
In 1998, the defendant appealed his conviction to the Court
of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
excluding
expert
testimony
regarding
eyewitness
4
8
identification.
Upon review, the court referred to its past
statement in State v. Ward,49 which stated that the "great
weight of authority in this country is that the study of the
reliability of eyewitness identification has not attained that
degree of exactitude which would qualify it as a specific
science." 50
Although the court recognized that this
statement may no longer be true, it found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's refusal to admit the
42 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000) [hereinafter Coley].
43

Id. at 833.

44Id.
45id.

46Id.
at 832-33.
47

Id.at 833.
State v. Coley, No. O1CO1-9707-CC-00270, 1998 WL 712838, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Coley Appeal].
49 712 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
'oId.at 487.
48

9

2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 401

testimony. 51 At this point, the court did not adopt a per se
rule of exclusion of expert testimony regarding
eyewitnesses, but instead, stated that the issue was one that
should remain a matter for the trial court's discretion on a
case-by-case basis.52 In 2000, Coley renewed his request
for permission to appeal from the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. 53 This court, however, dealt a much harsher
ruling on the issue, proclaiming that the testimony was per
se inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence. 54 The Tennessee Supreme Court held that:
Expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification arguably fails to satisfy the
plain meaning of this language. Eyewitness
testimony has no scientific or technical
underpinnings which would be outside the
common understanding of the jury;
therefore, expert testimony is not necessary
to help jurors "understand" the eyewitness's
Moreover, expert testimony
testimony.
about the eyewitness's accuracy does not aid
the jury in determining a fact in issue
because the question whether an eyewitness
should be believed is not a "fact in issue"
but rather a credibility determination. 55
In reaching this decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court
cited two cases, State v. Ward5 6 and State v. Wooden,57
previously decided in the Tennessee Court of Criminal
51 Coley

Appeal, 1998 WL 712838, at *3.

52 id.

51
54

55
56

57

Coley, 32 S.W.3d at 831.
838.
Id. at 833-34.

1d. at

Ward, 712 S.W.2d at 485.

658 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

10
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Appeals. Interestingly, State v. Ward 58 is the same case
that the Court of Appeals cited in Coley's initial appeal
stating that the unreliability of this sort of testimony was no
longer accurate. 59
The Tennessee Supreme Court
apparently overlooked this comment when it referred to the
case as a rationale for its holding. While the Court of
Criminal Appeals appeared to take a more liberal step
towards admitting this type of testimony, the Tennessee
Supreme Court did just the opposite. The court found that
(1) "expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification
simply offers generalities" and lacks scientific or technical
underpinnings; (2) "the subject of reliability of eyewitness
identification is within the common understanding of
reasonable persons"; (3) the testimony might "mislead and
confuse" the jury causing undue prejudice because of its
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness; and (4)
cross-examination and jury instructions are
appropriate aids
60
in protecting the rights of the defendant.
This decision shut the door on expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identification in the State of
Tennessee. Therefore, defendants will never be permitted
to introduce this type of testimony at trial. How valid are
these conclusions reached by the Tennessee Supreme
Court?
IV.

Overview of State and Federal Decisions on
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Testimony

The decision reached in Tennessee, and the
rationale used in making that decision, leads one to wonder
if this logic is representative of the thinking of judges
across the nation. If the decision in Tennessee was reached

58 Ward, 712 S.W.2d at 485.

" Coley Appeal, 1998 WL 712838, at *3.
60 Coley, 32 S.W.2d at 837-38.

11
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62
using the standards outlined in Daubert61 and McDaniel,
then should similar trends be found in other jurisdictions?
In order to answer this query, we took the most direct
approach by delving into an extensive search of recent
rulings made across the nation on this exact issue. This
research analyzed published cases from each state and
federal circuit to determine how other courts are ruling on
the issue of the admissibility of expert eyewitness
testimony. While the most recent authoritative cases on the
issue are presented, it should be recognized that they may
or may not constitute cases in which the rule is established.
However, there will be some discussion of prior precedent.
This section will report the results of our comprehensive
search. Overall, the results indicate that judicial reasoning
and decisions for admitting or excluding eyewitness experts
are very inconsistent across the states and federal circuits.
Each case was analyzed for content and sorted
according to the ruling made by the court. There are two
broad approaches that can be taken by a court when ruling
on this issue. The first is known as the discretionary
approach. This approach leaves the admissibility and limits
of expert testimony to the discretion of the trial court, under
which appellate judges can affirm the admission or
exclusion of the testimony or remand the case to the trial
court for further analysis. This is the broadest category and
has been adopted by a majority of the courts. Within this
approach, several different decisions may be made, all of
which allow the appellate court to rationalize its reasons for
admitting or excluding the expert testimony on a case-bycase basis. There are five types of decisions under the
discretionary approach: (1) those which admit the
testimony and declare that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence, (2) those which admit
the testimony and declare that the trial court did abuse its
61 509 U.S. at 579.
62

955 S.W.2d at 257.

12
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discretion in excluding the testimony, (3) those which do
not admit the testimony and declare that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, (4)
those which do not admit the testimony but claim that, in
general, the testimony could be admissible under other
circumstances, or (5) those which remand the case to the
trial court for further review.
The second type of approach taken by courts is
known as the prohibitoryapproach. This is a per se rule of
exclusion, prohibiting the exercise of discretion and the
admission of expert eyewitness testimony under any
circumstances. While it initially may appear that courts are
turning away from this approach to adopt the approach of
the majority in a discretionary view, our analysis reveals
that many courts are using the "discretionary" approach as
a guise, but are basically still operating in a manner that is
nearly per se exclusionary. Table 1 provides further
clarification for how a court may rule on the issues.
A.

State Analysis

In the most recent cases involving an attempt to
introduce an eyewitness expert, the court admitted the
testimony in only four states (9%) and excluded it in thirtyeight states (83%). The reviewing court remanded the case
back to the trial court for further review in four states
(9%).63 As shown in Table 2, the majority of states (98%)
take a discretionary approach to the issue, while only one
state (Tennessee) takes a prohibitory approach, ruling the
testimony per se inadmissible under all circumstances. Of
the states that take a discretionary approach, however,
fifteen states (33%) ruled that the testimony was
63

The review is based on only forty-six states because the issue of

eyewitness experts was not addressed in published opinions in the
District of Columbia and four states: Hawaii, Montana, New
Hampshire, and New Mexico.
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inadmissible, using harsh language to suggest a nearly per
se rule of exclusion. Twenty-two states (43%) ruled that, in
general, the testimony is admissible, but for the
circumstances of the particular case, it was not admissible.
It should be noted that in four of these cases, partial
testimony was admitted. These are marked with an asterisk
in the table.
Each court's rationale is shown in Table 3. A
review of the rationale used for exclusion of the testimony
quickly makes it clear that the problem of variability in
judicial decision-making on this topic largely lies in the
discretionary approach. The problem is that courts rarely
overrule a trial court's exercise of discretion. If the
defendant appeals a trial court's decision, the appellate
court will only review the lower court decision under an
"abuse of discretion" rule. This approach means that, even
though the evidence may be otherwise admissible, the trial
court decision will only be overturned if the court has
abused its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence or if
the exclusion was not harmless to the outcome of the case.
With this type of review, trial court decisions are rarely
overturned, which aids in keeping expert identification
testimony out of the court.
By looking at some examples of the rationale used
within each category, it is obvious that the rationale used is
inconsistent and varies widely. In Tennessee, the only state
with a prohibitory approach, the court was very forceful
and stringent in its logic in State v. McKinney, 64 a decision
made subsequent to and making reference to Coley.65
Eyewitness testimony has no scientific or
technical underpinnings which would be
outside the common understanding of the
jury; therefore, expert testimony is not
64

74 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. 2002).

6532 S.W.3d at 833-34.
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necessary to help jurors "understand" the
eyewitness's testimony. Moreover, expert
testimony about the eyewitness's accuracy
does not aid the jury in determining a fact in
issue because the question whether an
eyewitness should be believed is not a "fact
in issue" but
rather a credibility
66
determination.
With this type of reasoning, Tennessee will never admit
expert testimony on eyewitness issues. Now, turning to the
rationale used within the discretionary approach,
unfortunately some of the same logic used in State v. Coley
is evident. 67
Fifteen states claim that they hold a
discretionary view, yet they use language similar to the
language used in Coley. For example, in Utley v. State, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held, "The question whether
these witnesses were mistaken in their identification,
whether from fright or other cause, was one which the jury,
and not an expert witness, should answer." 68 Thus, the
expert's testimony was a matter of common understanding
and would not assist the trier of fact. A similar example is
Johnson v. State, where the Florida Supreme Court found
that "a jury is fully capable of assessing a witness' ability
to perceive and remember, given the assistance of crossexamination and cautionary instructions. ' ' 69 In this case the
court ruled, "Reliability of eyewitness identification is
70
within the realm of jurors' knowledge and experience."
Similarly, in State v. Gaines, the Kansas Supreme Court
"continue[d] to follow the previous line of cases and h[e]ld
that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification
6McKinney, 74

S.W.3d at 302 (quoting State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831,
833-34 (Tenn. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 32 S.W.3d at 831.
68 826 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Ark. 1992).
69
Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d. 774, 777 (Fla. 1983).
70

id.

15
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should not be admitted into trial.'
In the Oregon
decision, State v. Goldsby, the court even recognized that
"eyewitness identification evidence has a built-in potential
for error, but concluded that the law does not deal with that
potential by allowing experts to debate the quality of
evidence for the jury." 72 This rationale makes it quite clear
that the court renders this type of testimony unnecessary,
implying that the court would be highly unlikely ever to
admit it.
Within the largest category, May Be Admissible:
Discretion Not Abused in Excluding, twenty-two states
decided that while under some circumstances this type of
testimony may be admissible, under the facts of the
particular case, the testimony was not admissible. The
rationale used in this category generally suggests that
admission of eyewitness experts is possible, but not
probable. The barrage of reasoning amounts to little more
than general excuses. For example, in In re Williams, the
Alabama Supreme Court excluded evidence on the basis
that the expert was not familiar with facts of case and had
no personal contact with victim or knowledge of the
event.73 Similarly, in State v. McClendon, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the expert could not state his
opinion to a "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." 74
Also, in State v. Miles, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided that there was nothing to suggest that expert
testimony would be particularly helpful to the jury in
evaluating the specific eyewitness testimony. 75 A number
of courts (Indiana, Massachusetts, and Nevada) found that
there was other corroborating evidence, which eliminated
71926 P.2d 641, 649 (Kan. 1996).
72 650 P.2d 952, 954 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting State v. Calia, 514
P.2d 1354, 1356) (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992).
74
730 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Conn. 1999).
75585 N.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Minn. 1998).
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the need for an expert. 76 In summary, all thirty-eight states
that would not admit the expert testimony explain the
exclusion with reasons which are both general and
inconsistent.
However, four states did admit expert testimony
pertaining to eyewitness reliability. Three states (Alaska,
California, and South Carolina) found that the exclusion of
the testimony by the trial court constituted an abuse of
discretion, holding that the testimony should have been
admitted. As any number of judges would attest, reaching
this decision on an issue speaks volumes. Note that the
rationale used by these judges is in direct opposition to the
rationale used by judges who exclude the experts. For
example, in California's landmark case of People v.
McDonald, the court reasoned,
It appears from the professional literature,
however, that other factors bearing on
eyewitness identification may be known
only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly
understood by many, or may be contrary to
the intuitive beliefs of most.

.

.

.

We

conclude that although jurors may not be
totally
unaware
of
the
foregoing
psychological factors bearing on eyewitness
identification, the body of information now
available on these matters is "sufficiently
beyond common experience" that in
appropriate cases expert opinion thereon
77
could at least "assist the trier of fact."
Additionally, in the Alaska case, Skamarocius v. State, the
76

State v. Cook, 734 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 2000); Commonwealth v.

Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116 (Mass. 1997); Fraternal Order v. Denver, 926
P.2d 589 (Colo. 1996).
77 690 P.2d 709, 720-21 (Cal. 1984).
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court explained that the identification of the assailant was
the main issue of the case, and that the expert testimony
was relevant and would have been helpful to the jury.78
The court concluded that the error in exclusion was not
harmless.7 9 Finally, the same issue was addressed in State
v. Whaley, in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
found that the main issue was identification, and numerous
factors existed that could have affected the witness
identifications. 80 These three decisions hold great weight
on the admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony because
these appellate courts decided that the trial court's
exclusion of the testimony was arbitrary.
It is interesting to note that while the facts in many
cases are similar, judges manage to reach completely
contradictory decisions. Unfortunately, an analysis of the
most recent decisions in the federal circuits paints just as
bleak a picture.
B.

Federal Analysis

An analysis of eleven circuits reveals that expert
testimony on eyewitness identification was not admitted in
any circuit. 81 The decisions within the circuits are broken
down in the same manner as the states. 82 As shown in
Table 4, none of the circuits currently take the prohibitory
approach on this issue. Three circuits (25%) found the
testimony inadmissible, using such harsh language that the
decisions can be construed as a per se rule of
inadmissibility. In United States v. Kime in the Eighth
Circuit, for example, the court concluded that the testimony
failed under the Daubert prongs because the scientific
78731 P.2d 63, 66-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
79

Id. at 66.

80406 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 1991).

No published cases were found in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District
of Columbia.
8
2 See Table 2.
8
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evidence would not assist the trier of fact. 83 All three of
these circuits (Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh) defer to the
issue that cross-examination and jury instruction are
sufficient tools to address problems related to eyewitness
identifications. 84 With this rationale in place, just like the
rationale of the states in the same category, the expert's
testimony is unlikely to ever be admitted.
While recognizing that in certain situations this type
of expert testimony may be admissible, over half of the
circuits (64%) do not find an abuse of discretion in the
exclusion of the expert testimony. 85 The rationale used in
this category varies widely, just as we have observed with
the states' reasoning. For example, in United States v.
Brien, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the defense offered nothing as far as literature or data to
affirm the expert's conclusions after being repeatedly asked
for it. 86 Other reasons for exclusion include the presence of
corroborating evidence (Fifth and Seventh Circuits), no
limited circumstances that call for expert eyewitness
testimony were present (Fourth Circuit), and the presence
of multiple eyewitnesses (Tenth Circuit). 87
One circuit stands apart from the rest in that it
decided that the exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of
discretion. However, in its decision in United States v.
Mathis, the Third Circuit decided that it was an abuse of
discretion to exclude the expert, but ultimately found the
exclusion to be harmless error. 88
The defendant's
conviction was upheld, after the court found that "portions
of [the expert's] proffered testimony should have been
3 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996).

84 See Table 4 for an example of a case from each circuit along with a
description of the decision.
85 Namely, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 10th Circuits..
8659 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995).
87
See Table 4 for an example of a case from each circuit along with a
description of the decision.
88 264 F.3d 321, 342-44 (3d Cir. 2001).
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admitted, [but] in the context of the record as a whole, his
testimony
was highly unlikely to have caused a different
89
result."
In summary, this article has revealed significant
variability in the decisions of courts as to whether to admit
The
or exclude testimony from eyewitness experts.
problem lies in the fact that the decisions reached are not
based primarily on the facts of the case, but instead based
on other factors like jurisdictional characteristics, personal
views of the judge, broad discretion granted to the trial
judge, and the ambiguity of admission criteria.
V.

Scientific Literature on the Issues Raised in
Coley, Daubert, and McDaniel

Four main issues which need to be addressed
emerge from this review. First, can trial judges, who have
little scientific training, adequately evaluate the scientific
validity of expert testimony in order to make a decision on
admissibility? Second, is the subject of reliability of
eyewitness identifications common knowledge to
reasonable people-what, in fact, does the average juror, or
even the average judge know about eyewitness issues?
Third, does rigorous cross-examination and instruction by
the court serve as effective safeguard to prevent wrongful
convictions based on errors in eyewitness testimony?
Fourth, what can be said about the scientific integrity of
social science research-is eyewitness memory research
sufficiently reliable and valid to warrant expert testimony
on the subject? Fortunately, a large body of empirical
research exists that can inform and help clarify each one
these issues.

89

I.

at 343.
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The Evaluation of Scientific Testimony

The existing rules and guidelines, such as Rules 702
and 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, place great
responsibility on trial judges because they require judges to
evaluate the merit and validity of scientific testimony
across diverse domains of knowledge without the benefit of
scientific training. Recent findings indicate that judges do
not possess the detailed and accurate understanding of
scientific methodology necessary to perform this task
effectively.
In a 2001 study, researchers Gatowski,
Dobbin, Richardson, Ginsberg, Merlino, and Dahir
surveyed a national sample of state court judges about their
knowledge of the Daubert factors used to evaluate
scientific
testimony. 90
These factors included:
falsifiability, error rate, peer review, and general
acceptance. 9 ' When asked to define these concepts, a clear
lack of comprehension was evident. Only four percent
were able to define falsifiability; similarly, only four
percent were able to define error rate. 92 While judges
showed a better understanding of peer review and general
acceptance, there was little consensus about which factors
were most important or how to combine the four guidelines
in evaluating expert testimony. 93
Research also shows that judges' evaluations are
not sufficiently sensitive to problems in the quality of
expert testimony. For example, in a study where judges
were presented with expert testimony that varied in terms
of the presence or absence of methodological problems and
whether or not the research was peer reviewed, the quality
of the expert testimony had no impact on judges'
90 Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 433-458 (2001).
9' See id. at 433.
92 id.
93 id.
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When judges were given training in
evaluations. 94
scientific methodology, however, their evaluations of
expert testimony increased in accuracy compared to those
of their untrained counterparts even though serious errors in
evaluation were still made. 95 Judges are forced to use the
Daubert standard to evaluate the scientific integrity of
expert testimony, although most lack adequate scientific
training and requisite knowledge of scientific principles.
Whether judges can adequately evaluate expert testimony
in general, and more specifically, expert testimony about
eyewitness memory, is open to serious debate.
B.

Is Knowledge of Eyewitness Memory Really
Common Sense?

One of the most commonly cited reasons for
excluding eyewitness expert testimony is that knowledge of
factors that can affect eyewitness accuracy is a matter of
common sense, and thus, jurors do not require assistance in
understanding eyewitness testimony. 96 The large body of
research that has examined people's understanding of
eyewitness memory has revealed significant shortcomings,
not only in the scope of the knowledge evidenced, but also
in terms of its general accuracy. In survey studies, where
jury-eligible citizens complete questionnaires about
eyewitness issues, large deficits have been found in what
people commonly believe to be true about eyewitness

94 See M. Kovera et al., The Effects of Peer-Review and Evidence

Quality on Judge Evaluation of Psychological Science: Are Judges
Effective Gate-Keepers? 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000).
95 id.
96 Benton, T. Rapus et al., Has Eyewitness Testimony Research
Penetrated the American Legal System?: A Synthesis of Case History,
Juror Knowledge, and Expert Testimony, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:

MEMORY FOR PEOPLE

(R.C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., in press).
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memory. 97 Second, what people believe are important
factors affecting eyewitness accuracy are often not
diagnostic of, and sometimes are even irrelevant to,
eyewitness accuracy. 98 For example, the relationship
between witness confidence and accuracy has consistently
posed a problem for lay persons. 99
While confident
witnesses are perceived to be more accurate, research
findings show that confidence is not a reliable indicator of
eyewitness accuracy.' 00 A large number of experimental
See id. See also ELIZABETH E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
(1979); R.C.L. Lindsay, Expectations of Eyewitness Performance:
Jurors' Verdicts Do Not Follow from Their Beliefs, in ADULT
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (D. F. Ross et al. eds., 1994); A. Daniel
Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness
Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE 13-40 (Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983);
John C. Brigham & Melissa P. WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and
Law Enforcement Personnel on the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349 (1983); Kenneth A.
Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common
UnderstandingConcerningEyewitness Behavior? 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
15, 30 (1982); Marcus D. Durham & Francis C. Dane, Juror
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior: Evidence for the Necessity of
Expert Testimony, 14 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSP. 299, 308 (1999); Saul
M. Kassin & Kimberly A. Bamdollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1241, 1249 (1992); Kevin McConkey &
Suzanne Roche, Knowledge of Eyewitness Memory, 24 AUSTL.
PSYCHOL. 377, 384 (1989); Elizabeth Noon & Clive Hollin, Lay
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior: A British Survey, 1 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 143, 153 (1987); George Rahaim & Stanley
Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common Sense: Juror and
Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
15 (1982); John S. Shaw et al., A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Testimony, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 71 (1999).
98 Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and JurorPerceptions in
Eyewitness Identifications, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440-448 (1979).
99 1d.
1oo ld.; R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 333-339 (1989).
97
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studies have demonstrated that eyewitness confidence is a
better predictor of mock juror verdicts than eyewitness
accuracy, indicating that jurors are swayed by the
believability of eyewitnesses. 101 Even more problematic is
that experiments show that laypeople have great difficulty
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate witnesses.
Mock jurors show a high level of belief in the testimony of
both accurate and inaccurate witnesses.102 Mock jurors
also tend to overestimate accuracy rates in eyewitness
identification situations, revealing an underlying belief that
eyewitnesses tend to be fairly accurate.' 0 3 Brigham and
Bothwell found that a majority of their survey respondents
(63%) believed that more than fifty percent of eyewitness
identifications made are correct. 104
Third, lay persons underestimate the importance of
101 See

Neil

Brewer

&

Anne

Burke, Effects

of Testimonial

Inconsistenciesand Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments,
26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 364 (2002); Brian L. Cutler et al.,
NonadversarialMethods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence,
20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197, 1207 (1990); Steven Fox & H. A.
Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and
Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 215, 228 (1986); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations? 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 89 (1981); Lindsay, Mock-Juror Belief supra
note 100; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and
Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y &L. 817, 845 (1995).
102Lindsay, Mock-Juror Belief supra note 100; R.C.L. Lindsay et al.,
Mock-Juror Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 447-459.
(1986).
103Brewer & Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies,supra note
101; Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods, supra note 101; Fox &
Walters, The Impact of General,supra note 101; Lindsay et al., MockJurorBelief supra at note 100; Penrod & Cutler, Witness Confidence,
s pra note 101.
John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective
Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 19, 30 (1983).
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good indicators of eyewitness accuracy. For example,
when mock jurors are presented with information such as
lineup instructions and fairness, exposure to mug shots,
retention
interval, lighting
conditions, cross-race
identifications, and weapon presence, which are all factors
relevant to witness accuracy, this information often fails to
impact verdicts.10 5 Overall, this body of research shows a
clear lack of correspondence between lay knowledge of
eyewitness issues and the preponderance of scientific
evidence. Thus, it follows that knowledge of eyewitness
memory is not a matter of common sense.
More recently, research has focused on the
knowledgeability of various professional groups who
interact directly with eyewitnesses, specifically assessing
what judges, attorneys, and law enforcement professionals
know about eyewitness memory issues.' ° 6 Unfortunately,
the research findings reveal similar deficits in knowledge
among professional groups as those observed with jury105

Jordan Abshire & Brian H. Bomstien, JurorSensitivity to the Cross-

Race Effect, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 471-80 (2003); Cutler et al.,
NonadversarialMethods, supra note 101; Cutler et al., The Reliability
of Eyewitness Identifications: The Role of System and Estimator
Variables, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233-58 (1987); Lindsay et al., MockJurorEvaluations,supra note 102.
106 A.D. Yarmey & H.P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness
Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE 13-40 (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B.R. Clifford eds., 1983); Tanja
Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense:
Comparing Jurors, Judges, and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness
Experts, 20 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115-129; Brigham &
WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys, supra note 97; S.M. Kassin et al.,
The "GeneralAcceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089-98 (1989);
S.M. Kassin et al., On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness
Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 50 AM. PSYCHOL.
405-416 (2001); Noon & Hollin, Lay Knowledge, supra note 97;
Rahaim & Brodsky, Empirical Evidence, supra note 97; Richard A.
Wise & Martin A. Safer, What U.S. Judges Know and Believe about
Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427-443 (2004).
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eligible citizens. 07
Across questionnaire surveys, attorneys as well as
law enforcement officers showed similar levels of overall
accuracy as potential jurors (approximately 45%).108
Further, like lay persons, attorneys and law enforcement
personnel
expressed the belief that eyewitness
identification is relatively accurate. For example, in a 1983
study, Brigham and WolfsKeil found that a majority of
their sample of prosecuting attorneys (84%) and law
officers (63%) believed that ninety percent or more of the
eyewitness identifications they had observed were probably
accurate.l°9 Furthermore, the great majority of both these
groups believed that0 witness confidence is positively
related to accuracy."
Recent studies of judicial knowledge present a
similar pattern.
Across studies, judges averaged
approximately sixty percent correct on eyewitness
knowledge questions, which is comparable to accuracy
rates obtained from lay jurors whose performance across
similar questionnaires ranged from thirty-five percent to
sixty-one percent."l1
Furthermore, judges tend to
overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. In
a 2004 study, for example, Richard A. Wise and Martin A.
Safer surveyed judges about their perceptions of the
reliability of eyewitness testimony and its relation to
wrongful convictions.' 12 Less than half the judges (43%)
indicated that eyewitness error contributes to at least half of
107 Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory, supra note 106; R. Seltzer et al.,
Juror Ability

to

Recognize

the

Limitations

of

Eyewitness

Identifications,3 FORENSic REP. 121-137 (1990).
108 Noon & Hollin, Lay Knowledge, supra note 97; Yarmey & Jones, Is
the Psychology of Eyewitness, supra note 106.

109 Brigham & WolfsKeil, Opinions ofAttorneys, supra note 97, at 342.
11Old.
11 Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory, supra note 106; Wise & Safer,
What U.S. Judges Know, supra note 106.
112
Wise & Safer, supra note 106, at 428.
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all wrongful convictions." 3 It should be noted that greater
knowledge of eyewitness issues in this particular sample of
judges was also associated with a more cautious assessment
4
of the value of eyewitness testimony in general. 1
On the basis of these results, we conclude that not
only are the limitations of eyewitness memory not common
sense to jurors, these limitations are also not common sense
to judges, attorneys, and law enforcement officers. This
body of research clearly shows that the lack of knowledge
is diffused through the legal system, from the law officers
who are responsible for collecting and preserving the
integrity of eyewitness identification evidence to the judges
and jurors who are faced with evaluating the credibility of
eyewitness testimony. This conclusion raises an important
issue: if judges, attorneys, and jurors have insufficient
knowledge about factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, are
there effective safeguards in the legal system to detect
errors in eyewitness testimony and prevent erroneous
convictions?
C.

Are Cross-Examination and Judicial
Instructions Effective Safeguards?

The legal system has historically recognized the
fallible nature of eyewitness testimony and, therefore, has
implemented various constitutional safeguards to protect
defendants from wrongful convictions based on erroneous
eyewitness identification. 115 The most commonly used
safeguard is the cross-examination of a witness, which is
widely believed to effectively protect defendants from
erroneous conviction. 116
While it is also the most
13
' 1d. at 435.
114Id.

115

Winn S. Collins, Improving Eyewitness Evidence Collection

Proceduresin Wisconsin, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 529 (2003).
116 Christopher Walters, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1402, 1430 (1985).
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commonly used rationale for the exclusion of expert
testimony, research findings challenge the use of crossexamination as an effective protective tool. l l7 In a 19798
study, Gary Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay, and T.J. Ferguson"
showed that mock jurors were unable to differentiate
between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses based on
cross-examination."l 9 In a further experiment, professional
attorneys were used to cross-examine witnesses in a mock
trial, but this still did not improve jurors' ability to
inaccurate
accurate
and
discriminate 2 0 between
eyewitnesses. 1

More recently, Devenport, Stinson, Cutler, and
Kravitz examined the effectiveness of this safeguard by
testing juror sensitivity to three types of bias in lineup
2
procedures-foil, instruction, and presentation format.' '
These types of bias consistently affect the suggestiveness
and quality of the lineup procedures.12 2 Foil bias is present
when the lineup foils do not match the description of the
culprit as given by the witness. 123 Instruction bias occurs
when the witness is explicitly told that the culprit is in the
124
lineup, or is not given the option to not choose a foil.
Presentation bias is related to showing witnesses
simultaneous lineups (where all the lineup members are
presented at the same time) versus sequentially presented
lineups (where each lineup member is shown one at a
125
the witness'
allows
time).
of the
comparison
decision topresentation
be based on the
identificationSequential

117

Devenport et al., Jurors' Perceptions,supra note 41; Gary Wells et

al.,
118 Accuracy, supra note 98.
Wells, Accuracy, supra note 98.
119.d
20

1 See Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief,supra note 100.

Devenport et al., Jurors'Perceptions,supra note 41.
122See Devenport et al., Jurors'Perceptions,supra note 41.

121

123 id
124/id.

125 jad.
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lineup member to his or her memory of the culprit rather
than to the other lineup members. 126 If the purpose of
cross-examination is to focus on the credibility and
accuracy of an eyewitness identification, then its
effectiveness hinges on both attorneys' and jurors' ability
to recognize suggestiveness. This procedural problem can
detrimentally
affect the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications. Research has found that jurors are most
sensitive to foil bias, somewhat sensitive to instruction bias,
and insensitive to presentation bias. 127 Overall, jurors were
weak in their ability to perceive suggestiveness
when bias
28
was present in the identification procedure. 1
Thus, several reasons explain why crossexamination may not be a truly effective safeguard. First,
as evidenced earlier, jurors, attorneys and judges all have
insufficient knowledge about factors affecting eyewitness
accuracy. Second, and more importantly, attorneys and
judges also lack awareness of specific factors, such as those
affecting the suggestiveness of lineup procedures. In a
study designed to examine whether attorneys are sensitive
to factors affecting lineup suggestiveness, Stinson,
Devenport, Cutler, and Kravitz found that while attorneys
rated foil-biased lineups as more suggestive than foilunbiased lineups, they rated sequential lineups as more
suggestive than simultaneous lineups. 129 This stands in
direct opposition to the research findings.' 30
Further,
attorneys had difficulties detecting and correcting biases in
126 i.
127 id.
128id.
129

See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Presence-of-

Counsel Safeguard? Attorney Perceptionsof Suggestiveness, Fairness,
and Correctability of Biased Lineup Procedures, 81 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 64, 75 (1996).
130 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 603-47 (1998).
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lineup instruction and presentation.' 31
Similar results have been found among judges, who
rated foil-biased and instruction-biased lineups as more
suggestive than foil-unbiased and instruction-unbiased
lineups. 132 However, judges also rated sequential lineups
If
as more suggestive than simultaneous lineups.' 33
attorneys are not fully aware of the issues that can
compromise witness accuracy, then it is much more
difficult to cross-examine properly with respect to them.
Consequently, an attorney's ability to develop a truly
effective cross-examination strategy is impaired in cases
where eyewitness testimony plays a pivotal role.
Given the tremendous importance that accurate
eyewitness testimony has in relation to the justice system,
over the last few decades, federal and state courts have
encouraged judges to instruct jurors about the factors that
should be considered in the evaluation of eyewitness
evidence. 134 Such judicial instructions represent another
safeguard relied upon by the court, assumed to be effective
in preventing errors. In Neil v. Biggers, the United States
Supreme Court recommended five criteria on which
1 35
evaluations of eyewitness evidence should be based.
These include: (1) the certainty of the identification; (2) the
quality of the eyewitness' view of the culprit; (3) the
amount of reported attention paid to the culprit; (4) the
match between the description of and the actual appearance
of the defendant; and (5) the time elapsed between

131 Veronica

Stinson et al., How Effective is the Presence, supra note

129.
13 2 1d.
33

See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective is the Motion-to-Suppress
Safeguard? Judges Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairnessof
Biased Lineup Procedures, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211, 216-17
(1997).
134 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
1

135

id.
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and the identification. 136
witnessing the crime
Unfortunately, research findings indicate that some of the
Biggers criteria are not reliable indicators of eyewitness
accuracy; yet these criteria are relied on by the court system
and, when they are satisfied, they are assumed to imply
eyewitness accuracy. 137 As previously delineated, research
shows that eyewitness certainty or confidence is not a
reliable indicator of identification accuracy, but this belief
is represented among the Biggers criteria!
The most widely used set of standardized
instructions arises from United States v. Telfaire.138 The
intent of these instructions is to assist jurors' evaluation of
eyewitness identification evidence, emphasizing to jurors
the importance of assessing whether the circumstances of
identification are, in fact, convincing in determining the
guilt of the defendant. 139 To this end, jurors are further
instructed to evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of the
eyewitness and to consider factors such as: (1) the length of
time the witness had to view the offender; (2) the lighting
conditions at that time; (3) any previous acquaintance with
the offender; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the
lineup identification. 14 What impact do these cautionary
instructions by the court have on jury decision-making?
Research has shown that judges' presentation of Telfaire
instructions neither sensitized mock jurors to potential
136 Id. at 199-200.
131See Amy L. Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of

Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A Test of the Five Biggers
Criteria,24 L. &HUM. BEHAV. 581, 582 (2000); Gary L. Wells & Amy
L. Bradfield, "Good You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessed Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Donna M.
Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v. Biggers Criteria
for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 34849 (1983).
138 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
139 id.
0
14
id.
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problems with eyewitness testimony, nor increased their
skepticism. 141
As a result, these findings have raised the question
of how comprehensible these instructions are to jurors.
When the Telfaire instructions were modified to be more
understandable to mock jurors, Edith Greene observed an
142
increase in skepticism towards eyewitness testimony.
Gabriella Ramirez, Dennis Zemba, and R. Edward
Geiselman, however, obtained less optimistic results in
comparing the impact of presenting both the Telfaire
instructions and the modified version on mock jurors'
evaluations of eyewitness testimony. 143
Rather than
improving decision-making, the Telfaire instructions
reduced mock jurors' sensitivity to the quality of
eyewitness evidence and either created skepticism in or
over reliance on the testimony depending on when these
instructions were presented to jurors.' 4
The more
comprehensible version of the instructions did not
adversely affect juror sensitivity, nor did it serve to
significantly improve it. 145 On the basis of these findings,
instructions by the court do not appear to have the desired
effect of improving jurors' ability to assess eyewitness
evidence because they do not seem to provide a clear path
for jurors to follow in evaluating an eyewitness.
Further, these findings speak to a more general
question related to'juror decision-making-how well does
the average juror assimilate and comprehend the plethora of
information presented in a case? Research indicates that
instructions presented to jurors are often misunderstood,
141
142

Cutler et al., NonadversarialMethods, supra note 101, at 1205.
Edith Greene, Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony:

Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 276
(1988).
143 See Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary Instructions on
EYewitness Memory, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31, 66 (1996).
Id. at31.
145 Id.
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either because they include numerous legal terms or
because they are often embedded within other lengthy
judicial instructions. 146 A large survey study of citizens
called for jury duty found that actual jurors understood
147
fewer than half the instructions they received at trial.
More generally, jurors often have difficulty comprehending
4
complex legal cases and the evidence presented to them.' W
These notable problems with interpretation and
comprehension of the information and instructions
presented in court appear to undermine the effectiveness of
judicial instructions as a legal safeguard.
D.

On The Scientific Status of Research on
Eyewitness Issues

From this review, it becomes evident that courts
have created and followed rules that often contradict what
the accumulation of empirical research demonstrates on a
variety of fronts; yet, the legal system remains skeptical of
social science research. 149 It has been observed that the
system has failed to integrate procedures recommended by
leading social science researchers, thereby making the
50
courts an ineffective solution to a serious problem.'
146

See

AMIRAM

ELWORK ET AL.,

MAKING

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(1982); Greene, supra note 142; LOFTUS, supra
note 97.
147 See Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understandingof the Law in
Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 554 (1992).
148 See Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases,
UNDERSTANDABLE

Nov. 1985, at 65-68; Sonya Ivkovic et al., Jurors' Evaluations
of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003).
149 Keith A. Findley, LearningFrom Our Mistakes: A CriminalJustice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333
(2002); Donald P. Judges, Two Cheersfor the Department of Justice's
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV.
231 (2000).
150 Collins, supra note 115.
TRIAL,
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Keith A. Findley states, "[C]ourts have created rules or
followed procedures that ignore or even contradict what the
empirical evidence shows."' 51 He specifically addresses
the issue of expert testimony:
[H]ard evidence shows that jurors do not
understand the psychological processes at
work in an eyewitness identification and
tend to rely an unwarranted extent on such
identifications. . . .Nonetheless, courts in
many jurisdictions routinely continue to
exclude expert testimony designed to
educate jurors on these matters, often on the
ground that such information is within the
common knowledge of jurors .... 152
In addition, Donald P. Judges notes that despite the years of
research that social scientists have devoted to the study of
eyewitness identification evidence, experts within the legal
community remain "skeptical."' 153 "The law's generic
skepticism of social science risks deteriorating into a
counter-productive bias if the legal system fails to
recognize the genuine
strides that social science has made
154
in recent decades."'
This skepticism and lack of knowledge about the
factors that affect eyewitness accuracy underlies not only
the misguided assumption that the understanding of these
issues is within the purview of "common sense," but also
the recurrent reasoning that eyewitness expert testimony is
not helpful to the trier of fact. Research indicates that
courts tend to be more critical of and look less favorably
upon expert testimony from social science researchers.
Findley, supra note 149, at 333.
Id. at 334.
153 Judges, supra note 149, at 236-37.
154 Id. at 237.
151

52

'
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Researchers Jennifer L. Groscup and Steven D. Penrod
conducted a study to assess how courts evaluated different
types of testimony, comparing testimony from police
officers to testimony from clinical and experimental
psychologists. 155 Groscup and Penrod found that testimony
from psychologists was admitted only about fifty percent of
the time, whereas testimony from police officers was
56
admitted about eight-six percent of the time. 1
Additionally, courts treated clinical and experimental
psychologists differently-testimony from experimental
psychologists was the least likely to be admitted, with an
admissibility rate of twenty-two percent, whereas their
clinical counterparts had an admissibility rate of fifty-six
percent.1 57
Questionnaire surveys further revealed a
tendency for judges to dismissively and negatively view the
field of social science. 158
This negative perception of psychological testimony
is probably a reflection of the courts' difficulty in
evaluating the reliability of scientific testimony in general,
and more specifically, the reliability of this particular type
of scientific testimony.' 59 Several important aspects of
research on eyewitness memory need to be highlighted and
clarified in order to promote a change in attitude toward
eyewitness expert testimony and improve its evaluation by
the legal system. All of these aspects speak to the issues of
reliability and validity in this field of research. First, the
existing body of research on eyewitness memory is large
and well-established. To date, 469 eyewitness experiments
60
have been conducted in just the last four decades.'
155 Jennifer L. Groscup & Steven D. Penrod, Battle of the Standardsfor
Experts in Criminal Cases: Police vs. Psychologists, 33 SETON HALL L.
REv.
1141 (2003).
156
1d. at 1151.
157 Id.
158
Id. at 1144-45.
159 Id. at 1145.
160 Steven Penrod & B. Bornstein, Generalizing Eyewitness Research,
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Second, a fairly substantial level of agreement exists
among eyewitness experts. Surveys of the opinions of
eyewitness experts on a large number of eyewitness
phenomena have demonstrated a relatively broad consensus
with regard to which variables do and do not impact
eyewitness performance. 161 Further, most of these issues
were viewed as reliable enough to be presented in court by
the majority of the experts.
Third, numerous meta-analyses of the eyewitness
research summarize and compare the findings across
studies, even those using different methodologies. 62 This
in 2

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (R.C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., in press).
161Kassin et al., The "GeneralAcceptance," supra note 106; Kassin et

al., On the "GeneralAcceptance, " supra note 106.

162 BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION:

(1995); Brian Cutler et
al., Conceptual, Practical and Empirical Issues Associated with
Eyewitness Identification Test Media, in ADULT EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 163 (Ross et al.
eds., 1994); Tara Anthony et al., Cross-RacialFacialIdentifications:A
Social Cognitive Integration, 18 PERSP. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296,
301 (1992); Robert K. Bothwell et al., Correlation of Eyewitness
Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 691, 695 (1987); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A
Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness
Memory, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 687 (2004); Christian A. Meissner &
John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in
Memory for Facts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y
& L. 3, 35 (2001); Joanna D. Pozzulo & R.C.L. Lindsay, Identification
Accuracy of Children Versus Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 549 (1998); Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis
of FacialIdentification Studies. 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 156 (1986);
Siegfried L. Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A
Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 327 (1995); Nancy M.
Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 413, 424 (1992); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations:A MetaAnalytic Comparison, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 523 (2003); Nancy M.
Steblay, SocialInfluence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW
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approach permits broader and more confident conclusions
to be drawn, not only about what variables affect
eyewitness accuracy, but also how they relate to each other
because the information from many studies has been
combined.
By submitting research results to metaanalyses, the reliability of research findings can be
empirically determined.
In addition to providing information about the
reliability of research findings, meta-analyses also provide
us with information about the external validity of this field
External validity defines how well
of research.
experiments, in their structure and design, correspond with
real-world situations. 63 Researchers have consistently
found that a number of important eyewitness variables,
such as lineup presentation (i.e., sequential v.
simultaneous), weapon focus, stress, and the cross-race
effect, can actually have a larger impact on the performance
of eyewitnesses when the experimental context more
The
closely matches real witnessing situations.' 64
As
Penrod
and
of
this
finding
are
substantial.
implications
Bornstein reason, this result indicates that eyewitness
research not only possesses external validity, it also reveals
that eyewitness research may actually underestimate the
magnitude of the impact65 that certain variables have on
eyewitness performance. 1
Consequently, several conclusions can be drawn
from this review of eyewitness research. First, contrary to
the Court's statement in Coley, the field clearly has the
of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 283 (1997); Ralph
N. Haber & Lyn R. Haber, A Meta-Analysis of Research on Eyewitness
Lineup Identification Accuracy: Paper Presented at the Annual
Convention of the Psychonomics Society, Orlando, Fl. November 16,
2001.
163 DAVID ELMES, BARRY KANKOWITZ, & HENRY ROEDIGER, METHODS
IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981).
164
Penrod & Bornstein, supra note 160.
1611d. at 543.
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"scientific or technical underpinnings which would be
outside the common understanding of the jury," as it meets
the criterion for scientific knowledge as delineated in
Daubert and McDaniel. Specifically, in order to qualify as
scientific knowledge, an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method. Second, researchers
compile the eyewitness research data derived from the
scientific method, and use it to create a scientific knowledge
base than can be generalized to real-world eyewitness
situations. Third, as Penrod and Bornstein concluded, the
empirically established reliability of a number of
eyewitness phenomena warrants not only the general
consensus observed among eyewitness experts but also the
admission of expert testimony on these issues. 166 More
pointedly, the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness
issues is warranted as scientific knowledge.
Fourth, the idea that eyewitness experts will not
assist the trier of fact because eyewitness testimony is
common sense to jurors, and that research in this area has
no scientific or technical basis, is clearly wrong. When
viewed in light of research showing that errors in
eyewitness memory are the single greatest cause of
wrongful convictions, the omission of expert testimony is
dangerous to our justice system. This finding dates back to
the 1930s and continues to be a major problem facing the
legal system. 167 For example, in a National Institute of
Justice study conducted by Conners, Lundregan, Miller,
and McEwen, DNA analyses were used to exonerate

'66Id. at 551.
167 EDWIN

MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:

SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Garden City
1932); R. BRANDON & C. DAVIES, WRONGFUL
IMPRISONMENT (1973); BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW

Publishing Co.

(1995); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); R. Huff et al.,
Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518. (1986).
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twenty-eight individuals. 168
It was found that ninety
percent of these wrongful convictions were due to errors in
eyewitness identification. 169 Analyses of an additional
twelve DNA exonerations by Gary Wells, Mark Small,
Steven Penrod, Roy Malpass, Solomon Fulero, and C.A.E.
Brimcombe found a similar result. 170 Across these two
studies, the sample of wrongful identifications included
five individuals who were convicted of capital crimes,
received the death penalty, and were awaiting execution.
The magnitude of this problem was sufficiently
large enough to warrant the attention of Attorney General
Janet Reno. A group of thirty-four professionals, including
research psychologists, attorneys, investigators, and police,
were commissioned to develop guidelines that could be
used by law enforcement officials to properly collect
identification evidence.1 71 The product of the commission
was a 1999 Department of Justice publication entitled,
1 72
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.
This Guide is based on a compilation of research that
depicts how to properly conduct investigatory lineups and
reduce identification bias. 173 In September of 2003, the
government published a companion manual entitled,
Eyewitness Evidence: A Trainer's Manual for Law
Enforcement.174 The manual was developed, in part, from
a previous set of guidelines for collecting identification
168

Edward T. Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by

Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish
Innocence After Trial, 1996 U.S. Dept. of Just. Rep., NCJ 161258.
169 Id.
170 Gay Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification, supra note 130.
171 Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, United States Dept. of Just.,
Office of Justice Programs (1999) [hereinafter Guide].
172 l.
173 l.

174

John Ashcroft, Deborah J. Daniels, Sarah V. Hard, Eyewitness

Evidence: A Trainer's Manualfor Law Enforcement, U.S. Dep't Just.
NIJ Special Report (2003).
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evidence published by the American Psychology and Law
175
Society and the American Psychological Association.
Clearly, these significant developments indicate that not
only is eyewitness evidence not a matter of common sense,
but highlight the strong scientific contribution that
eyewitness research has already made to social policy.
VI.

Conclusion

Some of the conclusions to be drawn from the
above discussion are disturbing. First, a majority of courts,
both state and federal, appear to reject the data collected
and the conclusions reached by eyewitness researchers in
the area of social science. This rejection tends to confirm
the notion that the operation of the judicial branch of
government is largely insular, relying on its own
conclusions in areas more properly left to the expertise of
others.
Second, the Daubert decision has put judges in an
extremely difficult position because they are now required
to evaluate the validity and reliability of scientific research.
This requires judges to comprehend and apply difficult
concepts such as peer review, falsifiability, and error rate in
their evaluation of science. Judges, however, typically
receive no formal training with respect to these concepts;
they are rarely taught these in law schools, and the research
reviewed here demonstrates judges have very poor
comprehension of these concepts. Even in the judicial
dissent of the decision reached in Daubert, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said,
Questions arise simply from reading this
part of the Court's opinion, and countless
more questions will surely arise when
hundreds of district judges try to apply its
175 Wells et al., supra note 130.
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offers of expert

. I defer to no one in my

confidence in federal judges; but I am at a
loss to know what is meant when it is said
that the scientific status of a theory depends
on its "falsifiability," and I suspect some of
them will be, too.'
Thus, without out a solid understanding of science, how
could one expect consistency in the judicial evaluation of
scientific expert testimony or scientific evidence in general,
much less across divergent disciplines that use different
research tools and methodologies?
This situation would appear to guarantee a judicial
system that lacks reliability, consistency, and validity in
terms of reaching proper and accurate conclusions
regarding the credibility of scientific evidence.
Consequently, it may lead judges to simply "let it all in and
let the jury sort it out." Yet, as the eyewitness research
reviewed
here
reveals,
jury
members
lack
knowledgeability, and, to compound matters further, they
obviously have less training than the trial judge. Thus, it
appears that neither the judge nor the jury serve as a
safeguard to the system with respect to the evaluation of
scientific testimony. This problem is further exacerbated
by the appellate standard of review, which affords almost
total deference to the trial judge under the abuse of
discretion standard. These types of decisions then seem to
be made for self-protection and result in a judicial system
that is highly resistant to change. With the reasoning of
Justice Rehnquist ringing loud and clear, the stare decisis
system of common law tends to lock in an incorrect
decision for a protracted period of time, thereby rendering
the system inflexible.
Perhaps one solution to this problem is to amend
176

509 U.S. 579, 600.
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Rule 702, return to the Frye standard, and look to the
acceptability of a scientific finding among experts in the
field. Another solution is to provide a stronger mechanism
for a trial court to utilize Rule 706, as suggested by Justice
Blackmun in Daubert.177 Under Rule 706, a trial judge,
faced with completely opposing opinions on an issue,
whether medical, engineering, or otherwise, may call an
independent expert to assess the methodology used by the
opposing experts, and who then provide the trial judge with
178
his opinion on admissibility of the scientific evidence.
This action would place the expert in the role of being a
"friend of the court" versus being viewed by the court as a
hired gun or advocate for the side who is paying his or her
fee.
Further, this article's analysis of this issue has
revealed additional problems. For example, we learn from
this investigation that appellate courts use terminology not
contained in Rule 702 time and time again. What does it
mean to "invade the province of the jury"? What is the
common or ordinary knowledge of a juror? How should a
battle of the experts occur if the gatekeeper is watching the
gate? If there is a battle of the experts, why is it bad if the
jury obtains more knowledge? Why does the system err in
favor of keeping information from the jury? How can a
court, in retrospect, possibly know if an error was
harmless?
Finally, if eyewitness memory were common sense,
then why are errors in eyewitness identification the leading
cause of wrongful convictions? Furthermore, why would
the Department of Justice perceive the problem to be of
such magnitude that it would develop and distribute a
Guide for law enforcement and a training manual for how
to use the Guide? In light of these developments and the
eyewitness research on which they are founded, to claim
17 7
178

Id. at 582.

FED. R. EvID. 706.
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that eyewitness memory is common sense to a jury and
non-scientific is simply nonsensical. Interestingly, the
Guide was not mentioned in a single case of our case-bycase analysis.
One obvious solution to the problem is to admit
eyewitness experts, allow them to testify about the
difference between estimator and system variables, and
these
variables
impact
eyewitness
about how
identifications. Estimator variables are not under the
control of the legal system, but are related to characteristics
of the witness and the circumstances in which the
remembered event was experienced, such as the presence
or absence of a weapon, age of the witness, and lighting
conditions. 179
System variables, in contrast, involve the
procedures used by law enforcement to collect
identification evidence, such as how the lineup is
constructed and presented, as well as the nature of the
instructions that witnesses are given. 180 The expert could
also testify about whether or not the procedures used in a
particular case were consistent with the Guide, thus
providing an important source of information to the jury
concerning the procedural flaws that can adversely affect
eyewitness accuracy. Even if this information does not
eventually reach a jury, it still can play a pivotal role in
earlier stages of the legal process.
It is time for the judicial system to stop being an
island and start building bridges to other repositories of
information. After all, if a social science has enough
credibility to find its way into colleges, universities, and
government policy, why can it not be permitted to find its
way into our judicial system?
179

Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System

Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. 1546, 1557 (1978).
180 !d.
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Appendix
Table 1: JudicialAdmissibility Decisions on Eyewitness Expert
Testimony
Approach
P
R

O

Decision type

Result

Explanation

Per se
inadmissible

Testimony
not admitted

The testimony will be
excluded under all
circumstances.

Inadmissible:
Discretion not
abused in
excluding

Testimony
not admitted

H
I
B
I
T
0
R
Y

+

The trial court did not
abuse its discretionary
powers in excluding the
evidence; strong language
suggests per se
inadmissibility.

May Be
Admissible:
Discretion not
abused in
excluding

Testimony
not admitted

Although the testimony is
admissible in general, it
was not admitted in this
case; rationale suggests
admissibility of testimony
is possible but not
probable. This category
can also include cases in
which some testimony was
admitted but the
defendant appealed the
exclusion of the remaining
testimony.

May Be
Admissible:
Discretion not
abused in
admitting

Testimony
admitted

The trial court did not
abuse its discretionary
powers in admitting the
testimony.
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May Be
Admissible:
Discretion
abused in
excludin2

Testimony
admitted

The trial court abused its
discretionary powers in
excluding the testimony
when it should have been
admitted.

May Be
Admissible;
Discretion
may or may
not have been
abused

Case
Remanded

The reviewing court finds
that the trial court did not
properly review the expert
testimony and remands it
back to the trial court to
conduct the proper
analvsis.
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Table 2: State and FederalCategorizationby Approach

Prohibitory: Court
explicitly declares a per
se inadmissibility rule.

Tennessee

Inadmissible: Under
discretionary view, these
courts find that
discretion was not
abused in excluding the
testimony. These
decisions use strong
language which suggests
a per se rule of
inadmissibility.

Arkansas
Florida
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi

May Be Admissible, but
not admitted in this case:
Under discretionary
view, although the
testimony is admissible
in general, the court
found that discretion
was not abused in
refusing to admit, and
rationale often suggests
admissibility of
testimony is possible but
not probable.

None

4

4

4

Alabama
Arizona*
Connecticut
Delaware*
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Nevada
New York

Eighth
Ninth
Eleventh

Missouri
Nebraska
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Vermont

North Carolina
North Dakota*
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Virginia*
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

First
Second
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Tenth

*Partial testimony was
admitted in these cases
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May Be Admissible:
Discretion Abused in
Refusing to Admit the
testimony.

Alaska
California
South Carolina

Third

May Be Admissible:
Discretion Not Abused
in Admitting testimony.

South Dakota

None

May Be Admissible: Case
Remanded for Further
Review.

Colorado
Iowa
Kentucky
New Jersev

None
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Table 3: Decisions and Rationale by State
State

Most Recent Case

Ruling

1.Alabama

Exparte Williams,
594 So. 2d 1225
(Ala. 1992).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Expert not familiar with facts of
case, had no personal contact with victim
or knowledge of event.

2. Alaska

Skamarocius v.
State, 731 P.2d 63
(Alaska Ct. App.
1987).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Trial court ruling overturned,
testimony should have been admitted.
Trial court abused its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony because
the identification of defendant as the
assailant by the witness was weak and
uncorroborated.

3. Arizona

State v. Nordstrum,
25 P.3d 717 (Ariz.
2001).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The expert was permitted to
testify at length about a variety of
eyewitness variables, but was not
permitted to express any opinion about
the accuracy of the defendant's
eyewitness testimony or to address the
specifics of this case.

4. Arkansas

Utley v. State, 826
S.W.2d 268 (Ark.
1992).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. The
question whether these witnesses were
mistaken in their identification, whether
from fright or other cause, was one which
the jury, and not an expert witness,
should answer. The experts testimony
was a matter of common understanding
and would not assist the trier of fact.

5. California

People v.
McDonald,690
P.2d 709 (Cal.
1984).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Trial court judgment reversed.
The exclusion the eyewitness expert was
not harmless error. The court found it
reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have
been reached in absence of this error, and
the judgment must be reversed.
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6. Colorado

People v.
Campbell, 847
P.2d 228 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Case Remanded. The trial court erred in
relying on Frye as a basis for excluding
the proffered testimony. This error was
not harmless, and the case was remanded
to vacate judgment and reevaluate the
admissibility of the expert's testimony.

7. Connecticut

State v.
McClendon, 730
A.2d 1107 (Conn.
1999).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The general principles should
come as no surprise to the average juror.
He was unable to state his opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty.

8. Delaware

Garden v. State,
815 A.2d 327 (Del.
2003).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit but was Harmless Error. Partial
testimony allowed. Expert testified on a
variety of estimator variables but was not
permitted to testify on the
confidence/accuracy relationship. The
exclusion was ruled an abuse of
discretion but found to be harmless error.

9. District of
Columbia
10. Florida

No cases found.
Johnson v. State,
438 So. 2d 774
(Fla. 1983).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Held that
a jury is capable of assessing a witness'
ability to perceive and remember, given
assistance of cross-examination and
cautionary instruction.

11.

Georgia

Johnson v. State,
526 S.E.2d 549
(Ga. 2000).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Abundance of corroborating
evidence.

12.
13.

Hawaii
Idaho

No Cases Found
State v. Pacheco, 2
P.3d 752 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2000).

No Cases found.
Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Court refused to allow expert to
testify on the memory or perceptions'of
witnesses relative to the presence of a
firearm on the ground that such testimony
would not assist the trier of fact. This
court does recognize, however, that in
certain circumstances such testimony
may be of assistance to the jury.

See also State v.
Hoisington, 657
P.2d 17 (Idaho
1983).
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14.

Illinois

State v. Tisdel, 788
N.E.2d 1149 (Il1.
App. Ct. 2003).

Discretionary- May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The record shows that the judge
considered the reliability and potential
helpfulness of the testimony, balanced
the proffered testimony against cases in
which this court has upheld the exclusion
of such evidence, and found that the
testimony would not assist the jury. The
court notes, however, that had the trial
court allowed the testimony, it would not
have been an abuse of discretion.

15.

Indiana

Cook v. State, 734
N.E.2d 563 (Ind.
2000).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Defendant failed to establish the
factual predicate upon which his expert's
testimony would have rested. The
number of witnesses identifying
defendant as the shooter supports the
view that expert testimony in this case
would not have assisted the jury in
understanding the evidence or
determining any fact in issue.

16.

Iowa

State v. Schutz,
579 N.W.2d 317
(Iowa 1998).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit, Case Remanded. Per se
exclusionary rule overturned. The
exclusion of expert testimony is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and it was error to apply the
per se rule of exclusion. Case remanded
to the district court for a new trial.

17.

Kansas

State v. Gaines,
926 P.2d 641
(Kan. 1996).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Reliability
of eyewitness identification is within the
realm ofjurors' knowledge and
experience. We continue to follow the
previous line of cases and hold that
expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification should not be admitted.

18.

Kentucky

Commonwealth v.
Christie,98
S.W.3d 485 (Ky.
2002).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit, Case Remanded. Per se
exclusionary rule overturned. Lack of
direct evidence against defendant so
expert testimony should have been
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admitted. Blanket exclusion of expert
testimony was due to the trial court's
incorrect belief that that the testimony
was inadmissible per se. Case remanded
for new trial to determine the relevancy
and reliability of the testimony under a
proper analysis.
19.

Louisiana

State v. Gurley,
565 So. 2d 1055
(La. Ct. App.
1990).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value and
usurps jury's function. The testimony
would not have been an aid to the jury.

20.

Maine

State v. Kelly, 752
A.2d 188 (Me.
2000).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. The trial
court found that the testimony would not
be helpful to the jury, and the court did
instruct the jury. Therefore, the court's
conclusion that the expert's testimony
would not be helpful is not clearly
erroneous, and its decision to deny funds
for that reason was within its broad
discretion.

See also State v.
Rich, 549 A.2d
742 (Me. 1988).

Bloodsworth v.
State, 512 A.2d
1056 (Md. 1986).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Reliability
of the witnesses and the identification is
better tested by cross-examination than
by the opinion of an expert. Defendant
failed to make a case for the use of an
expert by failing to persuade the court
that the technique has general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community, and
the proffer is not sufficient to persuade
exactly what is even being offered to the
jury other than some generalized
explanation of the studies that have been
made. Nothing that has been proffered
suggests that it will be helpful.

22. Massachusetts

Commonwealth v.
Santoli, 680
N.E.2d 1116;
(Mass. 1997).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. No error in excluding the
testimony where the physical evidence
and other facts provided significant
corroboration of the victim's
identification.

23.

People v. Hill, 269
N.W. 2d 492
(Mich. Ct. App.

Discretionary - Inadmissible. The court
rejected defendant's assertion that the
trial court erred in excluding expert

21.

Maryland

Michigan
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1testimony on the process by which people
perceive and remember events and how
pretrial identification procedures could
affect this process. The expert did not
interview the eyewitnesses about whom
he was to testify and only observed them
in the courtroom. Also, the trial court
offered to let defendant pursue the matter
in closing argument.

24.

Minnesota

State v. Miles, 585
N.W.2d 368
(Minn. 1998).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. There is nothing to suggest that
expert testimony on the accuracy of
eyewitness identification in general
would be particularly helpful to the jury
in evaluating the specific eyewitness
testimony. Numerous safeguards are in
place, and there was other corroborating
evidence.

25.

Mississippi

White v. State, 847
So. 2d 886 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2002).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Evidence
did not rely on proven scientific
principles and court held that they had
been shown nothing to suggest that the
science about which the expert was to
testify is generally accepted.

26.

Missouri

State v. Whitmill,
780 S.W.2d 45
(Mo. 1989).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Relates to
the credibility of witnesses and
constitutes an invasion of the province of
the jury.

27.

Montana

28.

Nebraska

29.

Nevada

No cases found.
State v. George,
645 N.W.2d 777
(Neb. 2002).
See also State v.
Ammons, 305
N.W.2d 812 (Neb.
1981).
White v. State, 926
P.2d 291 (Nev.
1996).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Expert
testimony on reliability of eyewitness
identifications is unnecessary.

Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. There was corroborating
evidence of identification.

See also
Echavarriav.
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Hampshire
New Jersey
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State, 839 P.2d
589 (Nev. 1992).
No cases found

444

No cases found.

State v. Gunter,
554 A.2d 1356
(N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Case Remanded. Because there was no
preliminary hearing, we cannot say with
any assurance whether the proffered
testimony would have actually assisted
the jury. Nor can we begin to consider
the reliability issue. Case remanded to
hold preliminary hearing to determine
scientific reliability of expert's
testimony.

New Mexico

No cases found

No cases found.

33.

New York

People v. Lee, 750
N.E.2d 63 (N.Y.
2001).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The trial court was aware of
corroborating evidence in addition to the
identification testimony. Given the
particular facts and circumstances, we
cannot say the trial court's denial
constituted an abuse of discretion.

34.

North
Carolina

State v. Lee, 572
S.E.2d 170 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2002).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Testimony not case specific and
lacked probative value.

35.

North
Dakota

State v. Fontaine,
382 N.W. 2d 374
(N.D. 1986).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Partial testimony allowed. Expert
testified on several estimator variables,
but was not allowed to answer a
hypothetical question concerning
accuracy. The court did not abuse its
discretion.

36.

Ohio

State v. Buell, 489
N.E.2d 795 (Ohio
1986).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Expert testimony regarding the
credibility of a typical witness is
admissible, but testimony regarding the
credibility of a particularwitness is not.

37.

Oklahoma

Torres v. State,
1 962 P.2d 3 (Okla.

Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
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Crim. App. 1998).

Admit. While it might be that expert
testimony regarding eyewitness
identification would have been
admissible in this case, defendant did not
present any evidence to show what that
expert testimony would have revealed or
how the failure to present such expert
evidence prejudiced him.

Oregon

State v. Goldsby,
650 P.2d 952 (Or.
Ct. App. 1982).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Although
eyewitness identification evidence has a
built-in potential for error, the law does
not deal with that by allowing experts to
debate the quality of evidence for the
jury.

39. Pennsylvania

Commonwealth v.
Abdul-Salaam, 678
A.2d 342 (Pa.
1996).

Prohibitory - Inadmissible. Testimony
would give unwarranted appearance of
authority as to the subject of credibility, a
subject which an ordinary juror can
assess.

40.

Rhode
Island

State v. Martinez,
774 A.2d 15 (R.I.
2001).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. In general,
the jury does not need assistance in
determining the trustworthiness of an
eyewitness.

41.

South
Carolina

State v. Whaley,
406 S.E.2d 369
(S.C. 1991).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Trial court ruling reversed and
case remanded. It was an abuse of
discretion to exclude the expert's
testimony concerning eyewitness
reliability because the main issue in this
case was the identity of the assailant, the
only evidence establishing the defendant
as the assailant was the testimony of the
two eyewitnesses, and other factors
existed which could have affected the
identification.

42.

South
Dakota

State v. McCord,
505 N.W.2d 388
(S.D. 1993).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Admitting.
The only case in which the prosecution
called an identification expert. The court
ruled that jurors do not possess an
expert's comprehensive training in
assessing the reliability of identification.
The court found that the trial court did

38.
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not abuse its discretion in finding this
testimony as relevant.
43.

Tennessee

State v. McKinney,
74 S.W.3d 291
(Tenn. 2002).
See also State v.
Coley, 32 S.W.3d
831 (Tenn. 2000).
Weatherredv.
State, 15 S.W.3d
540 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000).

Prohibitory. Per se exclusionary rule.
Expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification is inadmissible and the
exclusion of such testimony does not
violate a defendant's due process right to
present a defense.
Discretionary - Inadmissible. Appellant
failed to carry his burden of showing that
the proffered testimony was scientifically
reliable or relevant.

44.

Texas

45.

Utah

State v. Maestas,
63 P.3d 621 (Utah
2002).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The trial court is in the best
position to balance the probative value of
proffered testimony against the risk of
intrusion upon the fact-finding functions
of the jury. The trial court acted within its
discretion in excluding the testimony.

46.

Vermont

State v. Percy, 595
A.2d 248 (Vt.
1990).

Discretionary - Inadmissible. Juries may
be made to understand psychological
factors which affect accuracy of an
identification through cross-examination
and closing arguments.

47.

Virginia

Currie v.
Commonwealth,
515 S.E.2d 335
(Va. Ct. App.
1999).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. Partial testimony allowed. It was
not error to limit expert witness's
testimony concerning the correlation
between eyewitness certainty and
accuracy, and those other areas of
witness's proffered testimony which were
within the common knowledge and
experience of the jurors.

48.

Washington

State v. Nordlund,
113 Wash. App.
1033 (Wash. Ct.
App'. 2002).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. During voir dire, the trial court
found that the potential jurors' answers
demonstrated that they already
understood each of the factors the expert
wanted to explain.
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49.

West
Virginia

State v. Taylor,
490 S.E.2d 748
(W.Va. 1997).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The testimony would not have
affected the overall outcome of the case.
Fees to hire an expert were denied.

50.

Wisconsin

State v. Blair,473
N.W.2d 566 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1991).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. All topics proffered were within
the common knowledge and sense and
perception of the jury.

51.

Wyoming

Engberg,v. Meyer,
820 P.2d 70 (Wyo.
1991).

Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Admit. The court recognizes the modem
trend more favorable to the admission of
expert testimony relating to eyewitness
identification, but holds that their
consistent rule is that the admission of
expert testimony is within the discretion
of the trial court.
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Table 4: Decisions and Rationaleby FederalCircuit
First Circuit
Maine
Massachusetts
New
Hampshire
Rhode Island

Second
Circuit
Connecticut
New York
Vermont

United States v. Brien,
59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir.
1995).

United States v.
Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280
Ci. 1999).

May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Abused in Exclusion.
The court of appeals sustained the
district court's ruling not to admit the
testimony on the ground that the defense
offered practically nothing as far as a
proffer of data or literature underlying
the expert's assumptions and
conclusions, despite being asked for it
repeatedly. There is no reason it
couldn't be supplied, and it was
necessary since the expert's testimony
"did not concern a single longestablished scientific principle."
May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Abused in Exclusion.
The court of appeals upheld the district
court's ruling that the expert could not
testify on the confidence-accuracy
relationship. It "would have confused
the jury's assessment of the officers'
credibility, thereby usurping their role."

Third Circuit
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania

Fourth
Circuit
Maryland
North
Carolina
South
Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia

United States v. Mathis,
264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir.
2001).

May Be Admissible. Discretion
Abused in Exclusion.
Despite finding that the government
abused its discretion in not admitting
several pieces of the proffered
testimony, the court of appeals
ultimately decided that had the
testimony been admitted, the outcome of
the case would not have been different.
Harmless error.

United States v. Harris,
995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir.
1993).

May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Abused in Exclusion.
The court affirmed the district court's
judgment, finding that none of the
limited circumstances under which
courts allow expert testimony on
eyewitness identification were present in
this case.
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Fifth Circuit
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas

United States v. Moore,
786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.
1986).

Not Admitted: Admissible, but
Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
The decision whether to admit this
testimony is squarely within the
discretion of the trial judge and properly
so. This is not a case in which the
eyewitness identification testimony is
critical. Even if the identifications of the
defendants are completely disregarded,
the other evidence of guilt are
overwhelming.

Sixth Circuit
Kentucky
Michigan
Ohio

Seventh
Circuit

United States v. Langan,
263 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.
2001).

Not Admitted: Admissible, but
Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court in that it
agreed that the testimony failed to meet
the second prong of Daubert,
which
requires that the proposed testimony fit
the issue to which the expert is
testifying. The court agreed that the
"hazards of eyewitness identification are
within the ordinary knowledge of most
lay jurors."

United States v.
Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826
(7th Cir. 2000).

Not Admitted: Admissible, but
Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
The court denies the defendant's motion
for the appointment of an eyewitness
identification expert because "the facts
of the case do not create an unusual or

Indiana
Wisconsin

compelling situation in which the aid of
an expert witness is required" and "as
the Seventh Circuit has stated, cross
examination, cautionary instructions,
and corroborating evidence can obviate
the need for expert testimony on
eyewitness identification."
Eiehth
Circuit
Arkansas
Iowa
Minnesota
Nebraska
North Dakota

United States v. Kime,
99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir.
1996).

Inadmissible.
The court agrees with the district's court
ruling to not admit the testimony for
several reasons: the testimony fails to
qualify as "scientific knowledge" under
Daubert's first prong; it fails under the
second prong because it would not assist
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the trier of fact since the evaluation of
eyewitness testimony is for the jury
alone and the testimony would intrude
the jury's domain; the minimal
probative value is outweighed by the
danger of juror confusion; the concerns
were adequately addressed in jury
instruction; and the testimony was
supported by several other witnesses.

South Dakota

Ninth Circuit
Alaska
Arizona
California
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Washington

Tenth Circuit
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Wyoming

Eleventh
Circuit
Alabama
Florida
Georgia

UnitedStates v.
Labansat, 94 F.3d 527
(9th Cir. 1996).

Inadmissible.

United States v. Smith,
156 F.3d 1046 (10th
Cir. 1998).

Not Admitted: Admissible, but
Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
The district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the testimony.
The district court considered the matter
in detail, conducting a lengthy Daubert

The court upheld the district court's
denial of the defendants request for
funds to hire an expert on eyewitness
identification because "as we have
previously explained, 'the admissibility
of this type of expert is strongly
disfavored in most courts' and any
weaknesses.. .can ordinarily be revealed
by counsel's careful cross-examination."
The defendant has not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that he was
prejudiced by the lack of expert
assistance.

hearing. There were five eyewitnesses
identifications, not
one.
United States v. Smith,
122 F.3d 1355 (11 th
Cir. 1997).

Inadmissible.
The court explains that, under the prior
panel precedent rule, it is bound by
earlier panel holdings. Expert testimony
not needed because the jury could
determine reliability under the tools of
cross-examination and jury instruction
to highlight particular problems in
eyewitness recollection. The defendant
was successful in this case in getting the
district court to instruct the jury about
cross-racial identification, potential bias
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in earlier identification, delay between
even and time of identification, and
stress. Therefore expert testimony not
needed.
D.C. Circuit

No cases found.
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